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The research reported here was conducted during the 
winter of 1970-71 in Connecticut and involved seventy-
two interviews with men charged with felonies. Forty-
nine of the respondents were inmates in the state prison 
or in a reformatory for youthful offenders; the remain-
ing twenty-three were not incarcerated, but were on 
probation or had received dismissals or acquittals. 
Approximately two-thirds of the men had been repre-
sented by Public Defenders; the remainder had been 
represented either by private attorneys or by a legal 
services organization in one Connecticut city. The 
material presented here is excerpted from lengthy inter-
views with these men (averaging about two hours) which 
explored their attitudes toward the criminal law and the 
institutions of criminal justice, with special attention to 
the plea-bargaining process. 
The Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal 
Justice of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administra-
tion and the Social Science Research Council provided 
financial support for this study. Neither is in any way 
responsible for nor endorses the arguments advanced 
here. 
Did You Have a Lawyer When You 
Went to Court? 
No, I Had a Public Defender. 
by Jonathan D. Casper 
Mr. Casper is Assistant Professor of Political Science at 
Yale University. 
"Only when we ... adopt a consumer perspective are 
we able to perceive the practical significance of our 
institutions, laws and public transactions in terms of 
their impacts upon the lives and homely experiences of 
human beings. It is these personal impacts that consti-
tute the criteria for any appraisal we may make. How, 
we ask, does the particular institution affect the personal 
rights and personal concerns, the interests and aspira-
tions of the individual, group, and community? We judge 
it according to its concussions on human lives."* 
Much of the discussion and controversy surrounding 
the provision of counsel to indigents in criminal cases, 
and especially the development of public and quasi-
public institutions to do this job, seems to have focused 
on two related issues: (1) the case overload that such 
systems typically encounter and the consequences of 
such caseloads for the quality of representation; and 
(2) the tendency for many lawyers who practice regular-
ly in criminal courts to develop relationships with and 
dependencies upon the prosecutors with whom they 
have frequent contact, and hence to modify the 
attorney's putative role as unequivocal advocate of the 
interests of his client. 
At least a partial solution to both these difficulties 
may appear to lie in the provision of a greater number of 
defense counsel. For example, the argument goes, larger 
Public Defender staffs would have more time to spend 
with their clients, might be in a better position to raise 
*Edmond Cahn, The Predicament of Modern Man. 1
et al.: Did You Have a Lawyer When You Went to Court?
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 1971
all potential legal defenses and might be less infected 
with the production ethic that makes so much of our 
criminal court system resemble an assembly line. An-
other notion, sometimes offered by those dismayed with 
the frequent collaborative relationships that develop be-
tween Public Defender and prosecutor, suggests that 
modification in the system ought rather to stress the use 
of assigned counsel-including lawyers who do not spend 
a great deal of time in criminal courts. Though these 
attorneys may lack the expertise in criminal law and in 
plea bargaining that the Public Defender possesses, they 
might not labor under the pressures for collaboration 
that many Public Defender offices seem to bear. 
However, both of these institutional mechanisms 
ignore a factor that ought to be considered in evaluating 
and changing institutional arrangements for provision of 
counsel to indigents. The research reported here suggests 
that viewing the process from the defendant's perspec-
tive reveals things that are not evident if one simply 
thinks about the issue from the perspective of adequate 
legal defense or if one makes inferences about what 
defendants may think. Definite attitudes about the 
nature of the relationship between lawyer and client 
emerged from these interviews, attitudes which might be 
helpful in assessing the merits of present and _Proposed 
systems. Since the data were all gathered from a single 
state, it is dangerous to generalize to the whole of 
American criminal justice. Nonetheless, these observa-
tions ~re offered as a contribution to the continuing 
dialogue over the provision of counsel to indigent 
defendants. 
The general attitude of most defendants toward their 
experience with the legal system was resignation (though 
not satisfaction). Almost all who had been convicted 
(and were either serving time in prison or were on proba-
tion) readily admitted that they were guilty of all or 
some of the charges against them. They were not, for the 
most part, openly embittered men, railing against the 
injustice that had been perpetrated upon them. "It was 
time for me to do some time" sums up the philosophy 
of many. 
Almost all saw their "crimes" as involving behavior 
that ought to be punished, and most accepted the fact 
that repeated law violation would eventually lead to ap-
prehension. Notions like adversary proceedings, the pre-
sumption of innocence, abstract concepts like "fairness," 
were not especially salient to these defendants and of 
little relevance to the world in which they found them-
selves. Reality-on the street and in the courtroom-was 
what concerned them. Though many hated this reality, 
the idea of holding it up and measuring it against ab-
stract standards like fairness was somewhat removed 
from their general concerns. 
As they saw it, the application of the criminal sanc-
tion was a process not much different from life on the 
street as they knew it. They tended to see the individuals 
and institutions which apprehended and punished 
them-police officers, prosecutors, Public Defenders, 
judges-as essentially playing "games" not much differ-
ent from the games they played themselves. They per-
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ceived the behavior of law enforcement officials as being 
essentially the same as the behavior of law violators-
conning, manipulating, lying, using power and resources 
rather than applying principles of justice, and lacking in 
concern for the characteristics and needs of others. Thus, 
law violation and law enforcement seemed to be morally 
indistinguishable. 
For many of the men, the game-like nature of the 
system extended even to their relationship to their 
la\\ryer. In particular, most of those who were repre-
sented by Public Defenders thought their major adver-
sary in the bargaining process to be not the prosecutor 
or the judge, but rather their own attorney, for he was 
the man with whom they had to bargain. They saw him 
as the surrogate of the prosecutor-a member of "their 
little syndicate"-rather than as their own representative. 
A defendant who was rather metaphorically inclined 
described his relationship with his lawyer and the nature 
of "the deal" as follows: 
"It's just like, you know, you got a junkie there, you 
know, and he needs a bag of dope, you know what I 
mean, and you tell him, 'Well, here's the bag of dope if 
you want it, or you gotta suffer it out, if you want to,' 
you know. I mean, here's the bag of dope if you want it; 
I mean, you don't have to take it, when you know damn 
well he gonna snatch at it, you know, 'cause the man is 
sick, you know what I mean." 
"You say the Public Defender is like that?" 
"Sure, you know, [it's as if someone says to a 
junkie] 'Well, here's the bag of dope. If you want it, 
you can take it; if you don't. .. ' Well, you know, you 
say, 'Yeh, I want it, I want it, you know, I'm sick, man,' 
you know. That's the way it is, man. It's nothing big to 
him. Like I say, he makes deals like this every day." 
Others made similar comments: 
"He seemed like he dido 't care one way or the other. 
He just cop out, you know. Like, like you see a police 
walking on the street writing a ticket out, you know. He 
puts a ticket on the car. He don't care whose car it is. 
Just like you, man. [The Public Defender] say, just, you 
know, 'You cop out to this', and you say, 'no', and he 
says, 'l see if I can get a better deal.' Then he brings an-
other offer: 'You cop out to this.' Just like that, you 
know. Just checking on the cop-outs." 
"A public defender is just like the prosecutor's 
assistant. Anything you tell this man, he's not gonna do 
anything but relay it back to the public defender (sic: he 
means the prosecutor], they'll come to some sort of 
agreement,and that's the best you're gonna get. You 
know, whatever they come to and he brings you back 
the first time, well, you better accept it because you 
may get more." 
" ... he just playing a middle game. You know, you're 
the Public Defender, now you, you don't care what hap-
pens to me, really ... you don't know me and I don't 
know you ... this is your job, that's all ... so, you're 
gonna go up there and say a little bit, you know, make it 
look like you're tryin' to help me, but actually you 
don't give a damn." 
"Do you think he was on your side?" 
"Ah, naw .. .I don't even .. .he didn't care, like I say, 
he didn't care ... he just wanted to, you know, get it 
over with, get the case over with." 
"What do you think [the Public Defender} was trying 
to achieve in your case?" 
"Just, ah, hurry up and get rid of me, get paid for an-
other client, you know." 
One defendant summarized the process in much the 
same way as do many critics of the interaction between 
defense counsel and prosecutors: 
"If a court has a heavy case load, it affects the pros-
ecutor, the judge and everybody concerned. Now, if 
they can ease this case load by the prosecutor giving a 
few, the Public Defender giving a few, it's a little better 
for everyone concerned. Take, for instance, ... Mr. 
Watkins [the chief prose cu tor in the district from which 
this man came]. Mr. Watkins runs his office, and Mr. 
Stankowski, the head Public Defender, he runs his office, 
but no one can't tell me that they're not on goo·d terms 
or even friends. If not friends, they're ... they've got a 
nice working arrangement. They've been knowing each 
other for over ten years. They got to have respect for 
each other, so forth and so on. Now, I guess when they 
sit down and go over a bunch of cases, they say, well, 
look at this guy, what are we going to do about him? 
You know he's guilty, but he's got this little technicality 
here, and it's true. I think the Public Defender sacrifice 
him and in his opinion he justifies it by asking a favor to 
maybe a kid that he's guilty but he's not pleading guilty. 
He's going to cause a lot of stink, and he's ... say, be-
cause he's young, let's give him a break. They could go 
through the trouble of convicting him if they want. 
Just. .. always, I think, in a sense, one hand washes the 
other." 
The bulk of the men I interviewed who were repre-
sented by Public Defenders (unlike those represented by 
private attorneys) did not feel that their lawyers were on 
their side. Rather, most felt, he was either a kind of 
middle-man or, more often, an agent of the prosecution. 
Why do they feel this way? Several factors seem impor-
tant, including the way in which their lawyer behaved 
towards them, their perception of his career ambition, 
and his institutional position. 
Most of the men spent very little time with their 
Public Defender. In the court in which they eventually 
plead guilty, they typically reported spending on the 
order of five to ten minutes with their Public Defender. 
These conversations usually took place in the bull-pen of 
the courthouse or in the hallway. 
The brief conversations usually did not involve much 
discussion of the details surrounding the alleged crime, 
mitigating circumstances or the defendants' motives or 
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backgrounds. Instead, they focused on the deal, the 
offer the prosecution was likely to make or had made in 
return for a cop-out. Often the defendants reported that 
the first words the Public Defender spoke (or at least the 
first words the defendants recalled) were,'I can get 
you ... , if you plead guilty.' Frequently, the Public 
Defender had already talked with the prosecutor, had 
seen the statements or evidence against the defendant 
and hence perhaps felt it unnecessary to ask him for his 
version of the offense. 
This behavior of the man who was supposed to be 
their lawyer- his previous contact with the prosecution, 
his immediate offer of a deal-led many of the defend-
ants to wonder whether the Public Defender was in fact 
"their" attorney or the state's. In one of the excerpts 
quoted above, a defendant said "the Public Defender" 
when he meant to say "the prosecutor". This mistake 
was common-at one point or another, most of the men 
interviewed either called the Public Defender the prose-
cutor or called the prosecutor the Public Defender. This 
is a subtle, but significant indication of the confusion of 
roles that these defendants perceived-the near inter-
changeability of "their" lawyer with the prosecutor. 
Another factor which generated mistrust was the 
common conviction that Public Defenders want to be-
come prosecutors and, after that, judges. One man put it 
this way: "The more convictions he get and the higher 
he can get." There are no systematic data available 
describing career patterns of Public Defenders in this 
state, but it is by no means unheard of for a Public 
Defender to join the prosecutor's staff. Such incidents 
become widely known, and contribute to the notion 
that the Public Defender must be working with the 
prosecution in order to further his own career ambitions. 
A third factor leading to distrust is the impression 
that the Public Defender really has nothing to gain by 
fighting hard for his clients. "He gets his money either 
way" was the common phrase-whether his client wins 
or loses. The ability of a "street lawyer" (private 
attorney) to get clients depends upon his reputation, and 
defendants believe that a good reputation is built by 
winning cases. The Public Defender, on the other hand, 
doesn't have to depend upon his reputation to get 
clients-he receives them automatically, whether he wins 
a lot of cases or loses a lot. Thus, from the defendant's 
vantage point, the Public Defender has nothing to gain 
(and, perhaps, something to lose) by vigorously defend-
ing his clients. 
The final factor contributing to the view that the 
Public Defender is not on the side of his clients is 
perhaps the most important. The Public Defender is an 
employee of the state and hence receives his income 
from the state. Defendants approach life with a simple, 
yet powerful premise. Put in the abstract form' it might 
be stated as follows: any two or more people receiving 
money from a common source must have common 
interests. In this context, it urges that since the prose-
cutor and the Public Defender are both employees of the 
same entity ("the state"), in a very important sense they 
cannot fight with one another. The piper calls the tune 
in this world, and if the same source is paying the prose-
cutor and the Public Defender, the reasonable expecta-
tion is that they will work together. 
In many ways, the men interviewed were "good" 
Americans. They have been exposed to and are very 
accepting of the ethic of the marketplace. For example, 
although most of the defendants felt that the poor fare 
worse in the legal system than do the affluent, they also 
believe that this situation could not be changed. More-
over, a majority felt that a society in which "there 
weren't any rich and weren't any poor, but everyone had 
about the same", would be less desirable than a society 
in which there was an opportunity for some to get more 
than others. By the same token, almost all-even those 
convicted of property crimes-were very accepting of 
and supportive of laws against taking the property of 
others: "After all, when I get rich I don't want someone 
taking it away from me." With a couple of exceptions, 
none of the men I spoke with was a modern-day Robin 
Hood taking from the rich to aid the poor, or a "radical" 
who believed that the rich had no "right" to possess 
what the poor cannot have. Indeed, they have inter-
nalized the market-place ethic of our society. They be-
lieve that you get what you pay for and that what costs 
more is better than (or at least as good as) what costs 
less. 
It is not surprising, then, that defendants who didn't 
have the money to purchase an attorney's service think 
that the "merchandise" which they were provided by 
the state was inferior to that which is available on the 
open market. In the defendants' view, the crucial differ-
ence between the private attorney and the Public 
Defender is not so much how each behaves, though this 
is of some significance, but rather the difference in the 
nature of the transaction between lawyer and client. The 
street lawyer is paid by his client and hence, again almost 
by definition, he must be on the client's side; the Public 
Defender is paid by the state, and hence he must be on 
the state's side. 
Thus, the common view was: "If only I'd had a street 
lawyer, I'd have come out much better." On the basis of 
the charges against the defendants, their own reports of 
the evidence against them, their past records, etc., this 
expectation often appeared to be somewhat unrealistic, 
for many seemed to have come out fairly well indeed. 1 
They were nevertheless generally dissatisfied with their 
representation, feeling that they had had no advocate. 
Each of the defendants who intimated he would have 
done better with a "street lawyer" was asked whether he 
had ever had one. Some had not, and were simply ex-
pressing blind faith in street lawyers and distrust of the 
Public Defender. Many others, though, had experiences 
with street lawyers, but the stories they told were quite 
mixed. A few spoke of "sure" convictions beaten by 
wily and dedicated street lawyers. Many described cases 
in which they appeared to have fared only moderately 
well-i.e., the outcome was about what one would 
expect-but which had cost them substantial amounts of 
money. Some related stories in which it looked as 
though they had been exploited-their sentences were 
harsh and the fee charged seemed exorbitant. Some ex-
pressed dissatisfaction with the outcome (none actually 
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wanted to be in prison), and some felt that. their lawyers 
might have worked harder or that their minds were on 
someone else's case and not theirs. But for almost all of 
them, an entirely different aura surrounded their view of 
the relationship they had had with their street lawyers. 
The lawyer was almost invariably reported to have been 
on their side, whether the man went to jail or got out-
and though they might quibble with his behavior, he still 
represented them. 
Having a lawyer "on my side" meant a variety of 
things-more mutual trust, an impression that the lawyer 
cared about the outcome of the case, a feeling that the 
defendant was entitled to give instructions to his 
attorney and participate in choices about how to 
proceed with the case. 
A number of the men interviewed had been repre-
sented by the Public Defender and had received sus-
pended sentences or dismissals. Though they had fared 
much better than those who received prison terms, their 
views of their lawyer-whether he was on their side, 
whether he cared what happened to "them-were typically 
the same as those who had fared worse. They tended to 
attribute the "good" outcome not to their lawyer, but 
to their own efforts ("I talked up to the judge") or to 
chance (e.g., "the prosecutor and judge had seen me play 
basketball;" "the clerk had misspelled my name and they 
didn't find my rap sheet and realize what a long record I 
had"). They generally refused to believe that their own 
attorneys were responsible for the outcome, for they 
refused to believe that their attorneys were on their side. 
Thus, in this jurisdiction at least, even when the Public 
Defender does well for his client, he does not usually 
seem to convince them that he has adequately repre-
sented them. The importance of money and the ex-
change process of the market-place emerges in the fol-
lowing dialogue with a defendant who had been repre-
sented by a Public Defender: 
"Suppose you'd said to your Public Defender, 
'Here's a hundred dollars if you can get me a suspended 
sentence'. Do you think he would have fought any 
harder for you?" 
'Tm almost positive he would. If you were a Public 
Defender. .. now, you're only gettin' paid by the state 
and a guy said, 'Look, if you can get this ... beat this 
case, I'll give you an extra hundred dollars on the side' ... 
I mean, you think, it's a hundred dollars, all you gotta· 
do is put a little more effort into it. .. and the judge 
usually listens to what they say .. .I mean they do ... just 
like anybody else would do, cause it's the next hundred 
dollars and that's what he's tryin' to do, he's trying to 
make as much money as he can." 
Many of the men interviewed envisioned the ideal 
relationship between lawyer and client to be a con-
tingent fee arrangement. The defendant would retain a 
lawyer for a small fee, and would pay him a further fee 
based upon the outcome of the case (e.g.,$ l ,000 for an 
acquittal or dismissal; $500 for a suspended sentence; 
$300 for a one to three; $100 for a two to five). Such an 
arrangement may not make great economic sense, for 
the outcome may not vary directly with the amount of 
time spent on a case. On the other hand, in some areas 
of litigation lawyers already charge flat fees, rather than 
hourly rates. 
The importance of the financial exchange between 
lawyer and client is further illuminated by the experi-
ence of defendants represented by attorneys from a 
neighborhood legal services program. Some confusion 
was evident in their attitudes toward these lawyers. 
Compared to Public Defenders, the legal assistance 
lawyers were generally perceived as fighting harder for 
their clients and as caring more about what happened to 
them. These attorneys do have the general reputation of 
being somewhat more confrontation-oriented than the 
Public Defender, of filing more motions, of having less 
cordial relationships with prosecutors and judges. In 
addition, more often than most Public Defenders, they 
visit their clients in the jail rather than meeting with 
them at the court-house. But, significantly, defendants 
represented by the legal assistance attorneys did not pay 
their attorneys and, as a result, they were somewhat 
confused about why these attorneys seemed to care 
about them, and were somewhat suspicious of this con-
cern. All respondents were asked whether they felt that 
their lawyer had been on their side. Almost without ex-
ception, those represented by private attorneys re-
sponded "yes" (many, in fact, indicated that they thought 
the question almost too obvious to answer). The bulk of 
those represented by Public Defenders said "no," indi-
cating that they felt that their lawyer was on the state's 
side, or in the middle. Those represented by legal as-
sistance attorneys were about equally divided in their 
replies to this question. Even those who replied that they 
felt that their attorney was on their side, though, did so 
with some qualification or bewilderment. Nearly all the 
men represented by legal assistance attorneys reported 
that, if they had a choice, they would prefer to be 
represented by private attorneys in future cases, but pre-
ferred the legal assistance attorneys to the Public De-
fender. This confusion and equivocal attitude toward the 
legal assistance lawyers again suggests the importance of 
the actual financial transaction between lawyer and 
client in providing defendants with the feeling that they 
have someone on their side. 
A defendant, then, is much more likely to believe that 
he has been adequately represented-that he has not 
stood alone as the object of a conspiracy of "them"-if 
he is able to engage in some kind of exchange relation-
ship with his attorney. With such an exchange-particu-
larly in the case of private lawyers-may go other things: 
a lawyer's willingness to spend more time with a client, 
more mutual trust, a client's feeling that he is in a 
position to give instructions to his attorney rather than 
simply do what he is told, more time spent on prepara-
tion of the case. But the crucial thing, from the defend-
ant's view-perhaps the prerequisite for the feeling that 
he has someone on his side-may be the exchange itself. 
And, thus, no matter how a Public Defender behaves, 
the defendants feeling of standing alone may persist. 
If this is true, and if we care about whether a defend-
ant takes from his encounter with the legal system some 
satisfaction that he has been treated fairly and that he 
has not simply been an object processed by a group of 5
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men interested not in him but in maintaining the produc-
tion system, then it suggests that it may not be enough 
simply to hire more Public Defenders or to adopt 
assigned counsel systems (in which the lawyer is paid by 
the state). 
Why should we worry about whether a man who goes 
through the criminal justice system feels that he has been 
treated fairly, feels that someone has been on his side? 
Both instrumental and purely normative arguments can 
be suggested. If the system is to teach defendants lessons 
about how they ought not to behave, then the members 
of the system ought to appear to be operating on a dif-
ferent moral level, not to be playing the same sorts of 
"games" that the defendant himself is used to playing in 
his own surroundings. In the eyes of the defendants 
interviewed, as was suggested above, one of the primary 
characteristics of the criminal justice system is that it 
seems to be essentially on the same moral level as their 
own lives and "crime"; and their feeling that they were 
not represented contributed greatly to this view. The 
participants in the system are seen as playing a game 
whose object is to punish the defendant and get rid of 
his case as quickly as possible. The outcome of a case is 
seen as depending primarily upon resources (e.g., money, 
fortitude, bluffing) and their exploitation and upon 
luck, not upon principles. Clearly, any suggestion that 
increasing the defendant's feeling that he has been 
treated fairly might reduce the incidence of crime is 
somewhat speculative. 
Hut it seems worthwhile to note that tne current 
operation of the system-in the eyes of the defendants, 
at least-not only fails to teach them moral lessons, but 
reinforces the idea that the system has no moral con tent. 
In addition to its potential instrumental conse-
quences, the current operation of the system is subject 
to criticism on purely normative grounds. When the 
government intervenes in the lives of its citizens-
through taxation, welfare programs, the Selective 
Service System, or whatever-it ought both to treat its 
citizens fairly and to give them the feeling that they 
have been treated fairly. This is especially true when it 
impinges in ways so severe and potentially destructive as 
the application of the criminal sanction. The obligation 
to give citizens the feeling that they have been treated 
fairly is necessary both to protect their sense of integrity 
and dignity and to maintain the legitimacy og govern-
mental institutions. 
The data reported here suggest that if we are to listen 
to the defendants, we ought to consider seriously 
schemes for the provision of counsel t.o indigents that do 
not involve as obvious and direct payment of the lawyer 
by the state as most Public Defender and assigned 
counsel systems do. Vou cher systems in which the 
defendant is given something like a chit and is then 
permitted to hire his own attorney mighi be a movement 
toward the literal transaction between lawyer and client 
that seems crucial in convincing the defendant that he 
had a lawyer who was on his side. Such systems would, 
perhaps, provide defendants with the needed feeling 
that, but for their choice, the lawyer would not have 
gotten the case or the money. It doesn't seem possible to 
design any system that will convince an indigent that he 
has been treated as fairly as the man who can afford to 
hire his own attorney. But some kind of voucher system 
might tend to alleviate the feeling of standing alone 
against a conspiracy of "them" that seems to permeate 
some Public Defender systems. 
Although, voucher systems might tend to be domi-
nated by a small number of marginal practitioners who 
depend upon turning over large numbers of cases very 
quickly to generate fees, this difficulty might be avoided 
by restrictions upon the number of cases that an indi-
vidual lawyer can take. Perhaps a combination of the 
voucher and assigned counsel systems might be worth 
considering. A panel of lawyers from a broad spectrum 
of the bar willing to take criminal cases would be pro-
vided to a defendant along with his voucher. He could 
then choose from the list and engage in the transaction 
with the lawyer he chooses. 
Another problem of voucher systems might be that, 
should they attract broader segments of the bar, more 
time will be required to dispose of cases, since a larger 
number of lawyers would be bargaining with the prose-
cutor. This may be a price worth paying, however, for 
giving defendants a greater sense that they had someone 
on their side. 
Giving the defendant the sense that he has been 
adequately represented is clearly not the only goal that 
ought to be of concern to members of the legal com-
munity. In addition, standards for what constitutes an 
adequate legal defense must be considered, and, to some 
extent, certainly, the legal community knows more 
about what a client ought to receive than does the client 
himself. Yet, the defendant's views-the consumer's 
perspective, the "concussions on human lives" of govern-
mental institutions-are worthy of consideration as well. 
I. Any statistical demonstration of this conclusion would be ex-
tremely difficult. Clearly, whether a sentence is "good" or "bad" 
depends upon a number of factors, including the nature of the 
offense, the circumstances surrounding it, the potential maxi-
mum penalty for the offense, the amount of harm done, the past 
record of the defendant. The plea-bargaining process makes 
statistical comparisons of defendants extremely difficult. The 
offense of which a defendant is convicted may be quite different 
from the one he committed (e.g., in many cases-but not all-a 
charge of robbery with violence becomes robbery; assault with 
intent to kill becomes aggravated assault; burglary becomes 
breaking and entering). In addition, comparison of the past 
records of defendants is also difficult. For example, two defend-
ants may have on their records a conviction for breach of peace. 
For one it may simply have been making noise or scuffling in 
the street; for another it may have been an aggravated assault 
that was bargained down to breach of peace. Because most 
defendants live in a single jurisdiction, judges and prosecutors 
are likely to recall the nature of the past offense, and hence be 
less willing to go easy on a defendant with the latter "breach of 
peace" conviction than on the former. 
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